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Abstract
We consider a two-period Bayesian trading game where in each period informed agents
decide whether to buy an asset (“government debt”) after observing an idiosyncratic signal
about the prospects of default. While second-period buyers only need to forecast default,
first-period buyers pass the asset to the new agents in the secondary market, and thus need
to form beliefs about the price that will prevail at that stage. We provide conditions such
that coarser information in the hands of second-period agents makes the price of debt more
resilient to bad shocks not only in the last period, but in the first one as well. We use
this model to study the consequences of issuing debt denominated in domestic vs. foreign
currency: we interpret the former as subject to inflation risk and the latter as subject to
default risk, with inflation driven by the information of a less-sophisticated group of agents
endowed with less precise information, and default by the information of sophisticated bond
traders. Our results can be used to account for the behavior of debt prices across countries
following the 2008 financial crisis, and also provide a theory of “original sin.”
∗For helpful comments and suggestions, we are indebted to Manuel Amador, Gadi Barlevy, Mariacristina De
Nardi, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Alessandro Pavan, Morten Ravn, and Laura Veldkamp. All errors remain our own.
Financial support from the ADEMU (H2020, No. 649396) project and from the ESRC Centre for Macroeconomics
is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
†Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, University College London, and IFS.
email:bassetto@nber.org
‡Department of Economics, University College London. email:carlo.galli.14@ucl.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
The sovereign borrowing experience of advanced economies in the aftermath of the financial
crisis of 2008 has once again highlighted the important role of the currency in which debt is
denominated. Countries which had control over their monetary policy, such as the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Japan, were able to borrow at extremely low rates throughout the
episode, even though they experienced very high deficit/GDP ratios (the UK) or debt/GDP
ratios (Japan). In contrast, peripheral Eurozone countries were either unable to borrow from the
market (Portugal, Ireland) or faced volatile interest rates when doing so (Italy, Spain).1
In previous crises, such as Latin America in the 1980s and Asia in 1998, currency mismatch
was identified as a source of instability, and hence many authors have studied the role of the
“original sin” or other causes of financial underdevelopment that led to the mismatch. In the
presence of nominal rigidities, having an own currency may allow for a quick devaluation as a
means to adjust to domestic shocks, preserving the country’s economy and ability to repay its
debt, but only if this debt is denominated in domestic currency.2
Compared to those crises, 2008 presents some important differences. First, financial underde-
velopment of the debt market was not a cause of the Eurozone countries’ difficulties, since they
all had an ample and liquid market for government debt denominated in their home currency
before joining the Euro. Second, it is not clear that the ability to devalue and thereby spare
the economy from a deeper recession was a major factor in explaining the different behavior of
interest rates: while it is true that the United Kingdom depreciated the Pound in the wake of the
recession, the Yen appreciated substantially against the Euro, exacerbating the slump in Japan.
Our goal is to dig deeper in the source of frictions that may make the price of a country’s
debt less sensitive to adverse news on the government solvency. A premise of our analysis is
1See e.g. Plender [35] and De Grauwe [21].
2Krugman [30, 31] sketches a theory whereby an asymmetry arises because defaults would lead to larger real
haircuts for bondholders than inflation. While it is true that a default is a discrete event and inflation erodes the
value of repayments over time, it is not a priori obvious that the cumulative losses would be different in the two
scenarios. We consider a benchmark in which losses are the same. Our mechanism would of course remain at
work even if inflation were less costly for creditors, as the two channels would complement each other.
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that a domestic currency partially insulates a country from default risk, as the government may
be able to lean on the central bank to act as a residual claimant on government debt securities.
However, the resulting increase in the money supply would be bound to generate inflation, so
that default risk would be replaced by inflation risk and we might expect interest rates to spike
similarly under the two scenarios. Yet in practice inflation expectations, as well as the behavior
of actual inflation, are very sluggish compared to the speed with which default crises, such as
Greece’s, unfold.
To reconcile these facts, we study an economy where private agents have dispersed and hetero-
geneous information about the government’s ability to repay its debt. Public debt is purchased
by overlapping generations of “bond traders”, a segment of the population which is more at-
tentive to economic news. In contrast, a much larger fraction of the population abstains from
trading in public debt, but uses nominal contracts in their everyday transactions. This larger
class, which we call the “workers,” are less sophisticated and receive noisier information about
government finances. We contrast two economies: in the first one, contracts are denominated
in an outside currency (the “Euro”), and the government is forced to outright default when its
tax revenues fall short of debt promises, while in the second one a domestic currency is present
(the “Yen”), and the government resorts to the printing press and eventual inflation to cover
any shortfalls. Other than this difference, we impose as much symmetry as possible between
the two economies: agents start with identical priors over government solvency, bond traders
receive signals with equal precision across the two economies, and the haircut upon default is
matched to the loss in value due to inflation. All these assumptions allow us to concentrate on
the consequences of heterogeneous information. When debt is denominated in Euros, there is no
interaction between bond traders and workers: when bond traders wish to sell their debt on the
secondary market, they need to find other (relatively well-informed) traders to buy. In contrast,
when debt is denominated in Yen, its nominal payoff is risk-free, and the relevant measure of risk
is captured by the purchasing power of the Yen. Since workers are assumed to be a much larger
group, they determine this price, based on their noisier information. In the special case in which
past prices are unobserved to current strategic participants, it is straightforward to prove that
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noisier information implies that the debt price is less responsive to incoming information about
government solvency, so Yen-denominated debt is more resilient to bad news. The anticipation
of this resilience in the secondary market in turn spills over to the primary market as well: even
well-informed traders are less responsive to their signals if they anticipate the future price to be
more weakly affected by fundamentals. We then show that, with some qualifications, this result
extends when the primary-market price is taken into account by future traders and workers.
In sum, our results confirm that heterogeneity between a small sophisticated group of bond
traders and a large, less informed population that drives the aggregate price level can explain
why domestic-currency debt may be less information-sensitive than foreign-currency debt (or
debt denominated in a common currency not directly controlled by the domestic central bank).
This result can account for why a country which starts from a favorable prior condition may
be able to better withstand the arrival of bad news. Conversely, our results also suggest that a
country who is perceived as very likely to default may find it easier to borrow in foreign currency
in the few instances in which its fundamentals are comparatively more favorable: sophisticated
bond traders would find it easier to spot the presence of such conditions, while a pessimistic
population may immediately fear (and trigger) hyperinflation. This could be an alternative
explanation for the “original sin.” Finally, while less information sensitivity may be good when
incoming news suggest worse fundamentals than prior information, ex ante this insurance comes
at a cost: only under special conditions can we unambiguously establish that ex-ante expected
interest rates are lower for countries issuing debt denominated in their domestic currency.
Our paper is related to the vast literature that has used the global-games approach pioneered
by Carlsson and van Damme [17] to study the fragility of regimes subject to infrequent crises.
Their methods were first applied to currency attacks by Morris and Shin [32]. The role of
signaling in this environment has been studied by Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan [7], and the
efficiency of information acquisition has been further analyzed by Angeletos and Pavan [9, 10].
Dasgupta [20] and Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan [8] studied learning in dynamic global games.
In a more general context of dispersed information, Amador and Weill [5, 6] considered learning
from aggregate prices in stylized macroeconomic models. Allen, Morris, and Shin [4] studied
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an environment in which an asset goes through multiple rounds of trade, as is our case. They
emphasized the dampening effect of higher-order beliefs on price movements and conversely the
greater emphasis that public signals take in that context. In our environment, as in theirs,
it is true that the response of the primary-market price to fundamentals is dampened by the
presence of a second round of trading. However, we emphasize a different force: we take as
given the presence of multiple rounds and consider the consequences of heterogeneous quality of
information in later rounds.3
The structure of our model is closely related to Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski [27] and
Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski [3], where a flexible specification of noisy information aggregation
in market prices is developed. Our paper considers a version of their model in which trade occurs
repeatedly. Our theorems are also related to Iachan and Nenov [28], whose paper presents a
systematic analysis of comparative statics results with respect to the precision of information in
global games.
On the international-economics side, the role of currency mismatch has been studied ex-
tensively, particularly in the years that follow the 1998 Asian crisis. Eichengreen and Haus-
mann [23] review competing theories about the origins of the mismatch, with an eye towards its
consequences and policies. Examples of theories of crises based on mismatch appear in Aghion,
Bacchetta, and Banerjee [1] and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi [16]. Particularly relevant for our
analysis is Bordo and Meissner [13]: they show that currency mismatch and “original sin” are
not necessarily harbingers of more frequent crises, provided fundamentals are managed correctly.
This is reminiscent of our result, in which it is not necessarily the unconditional probability
of eventual default or inflation that increases when debt is denominated in foreign currency:
fragility manifests itself instead as a greater volatility of debt prices. While we are not aware of
other papers linking imperfect information to the choice of denomination of government debt,
imperfect information in sovereign debt markets plays an important role in Sandleris [36], where
a default reveals adverse information about the state of the economy, with negative consequences
for private investment, and in Gu and Stangebye [26], where endogenous time-varying informa-
3In a static context, Corsetti et al. [19] consider a global game with a single large player who may be differ-
entially well informed from a continuum of small players.
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tion precision generates variation in risk premia.
Finally, the information sensitivity of assets play a major role in the work of Gorton and
Ordon˜ez [25]. While combining their forces and ours in a self-contained model is beyond the scope
of our project, their theory and our work are complementary in accounting for sudden sovereign
crises: as debt becomes more information-sensitive through the channels that we emphasize,
Gorton and Ordon˜ez’ forces would lead first-period agents to invest in even greater information
acquisition, leading to further volatility and possibly market freezes.
We proceed by describing the setup in Section 2, which also shows that the economy maps
into a two-stage Bayesian trading game. In Section 3 we analyze the simplest case: here, second-
period buyers cannot observe the first-period price. In Section 4 we tackle the harder (but more
realistic) case in which the first-period price is observed. Section 5 extends the result to cases in
which the default threshold may depend on the price of debt in the primary market, and Section
6 concludes.
2 The Setup
We consider an economy that lasts for three periods. There is a single consumption good in each
period. We consider two alternative scenarios: in the first one, the unit of account is exogenously
fixed (the “Euro”) and the price of the consumption good is normalized to 1. In the second case,
the value of a unit of account (the “Yen”) is endogenous.
The economy is populated by multiple generations of four types of agents: strategic workers,
noise workers, strategic bond traders, and noise bond traders. In addition, a government is also
present.
Workers are born in period 2 and die in period 3.4 Strategic workers are endowed with one
unit of the consumption good in period 2 and wish to consume in period 3; they are risk neutral
and have access to a storage technology which has a yield normalized to zero. Negative storage
is not allowed. Noise workers demand one unit of consumption in period 2, and can produce
4We could add workers that live in periods 1 and 2, but these would not interact with bond traders, and so
their presence would not have any effect on our results.
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exclusively in period 3. To consume, they trade with strategic workers using nominal contracts,
denominated in Euros or Yen, depending on the regime.5 The relative mass of noise vs. strategic
workers is Φ(w2 ), where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function and 
w
2 is i.i.d. with
a normal distribution having mean zero and variance 1/ψw2 . Neither strategic workers nor noise
workers have access to the bond market. Their asset position is limited to storage, trade credit
with each other, and cash, which they may acquire from the bond traders.6
Under the Euro scenario, workers do not interact with bond traders, and their interaction
with the government is limited to paying a lump-sum tax which is a negligible fraction of their
endowment.
Bond traders live for two periods, and there will be overlapping generations of them. Their
mass is negligible compared to workers; hence, when the two groups trade, the price is set
by the workers. Bond traders are endowed with goods in the first period of their life,7 which
they want to consume in the second period. Strategic traders can store their endowment at a
return normalized to 0. Alternatively, they can sell some of their endowment in exchange for a
government bond, which in period 1 can be purchased from the primary market and in period
2 from the secondary market, soon to be described. To preserve tractability, we assume that
holdings of government debt are limited to {0, 1}.8 Noise traders do not get a choice; they absorb
a fraction Φ(bt) of the government bonds supplied to the market, where 
b
t is i.i.d. with a normal
distribution having mean zero and variance 1/ψbt .
We next describe the government. We normalize its positions in per capita terms with respect
5We do not model the reason why workers coordinate on nominal contracts. Euro contracts are equivalent
to real contracts in our setup. Yen-denominated contracts favor strategic workers, as they can reap information
rents at the expense of noise workers.
6The assumption that workers cannot buy government bonds could be justified by indivisibility constraints as
in Wallace [38].
7We assume that their endowment is always sufficient to buy one unit of government bonds.
8The lower bound of 0 is equivalent to a short-selling constraint. Provided θ is sufficiently high, the upper
bound is equivalent to an indivisibility assumption, which implies that traders cannot hold a non-integer position
and do not have enough resources to buy two units. Consistently with the indivisibility assumption, we impose
that their holdings must be either 0 or 1, but risk neutrality implies that the analysis is unchanged if traders are
instead allowed any position in [0, 1].
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to one cohort of strategic bond traders. In the first period, the government issues nominal
bonds, backed by taxes that will be collected in period 3.9 Revenues from bond issuance are
spent in a public good which does not affect the marginal utility of private consumption. When
government bonds are denominated in Euros, they mature only in period 3, when the government
has access to tax revenues. When instead the Yen is present, bonds are repaid in cash in period
2, and period-3 revenues are used to repurchase cash, as in Cochrane [18]. This arrangement
corresponds to one of the important observations from which we started: that inflation is often
sluggish in advanced countries and workers often do not realize immediately that the government
is resorting to the printing press to cover its fiscal needs.10 In period 1, the government auctions
one unit of bonds with a promised repayment sˆ(q1) in period 3, where q1 := 1/(1 + R1) and R1
is the nominal interest rate. Two examples of the function sˆ are the following:
• sˆ(q1) ≡ sˆ ≡ 1, corresponding to the Eaton-Gersovitz [22] timing, in which the government
offers bonds making a fixed unit future repayment in period 3, and q1 represents the first-
period discount;
• sˆ(q1) ≡ 1/q1, corresponding to the Calvo [15] timing, in which the government offers bonds
to raise a fixed amount of revenues (one) in period 1 and 1/q1 − 1 represents promised
interest payments in period 3.
The ability of the government to raise revenues without a default in period 3 is limited by a
single random variable s. If s ≥ sˆ(q1), revenues from current and future taxes are sufficient to
repay the debt in full (under the Euro interpretation) or to maintain the price of goods pegged
at parity with the Yen (when the government has its own currency). When instead s < sˆ(q1),
tax revenues are insufficient to avoid explicit default or inflation. In this case, we assume that
9Since the relative mass of traders is small compared to the mass of workers, the amount of these taxes per
worker is negligible, and no issue about worker solvency arises.
10We view this assumption as particularly appropriate for a government who has in the past established a
reputation for stability. There are examples in history where this assumption would be violated. Sargent [37]
discusses cases in which inflation responded quickly to fiscal news, and other, more recent cases in which doubts
about the fiscal stance led to sluggish adjustments.
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the government imposes an exogenous haircut and only repays θsˆ(q1) units of the consumption
good in period 3. When debt is denominated in Euros, this is implemented directly as a haircut
upon default. When instead debt is denominated in Yen, the revenues θsˆ(q1) are available to
repurchase Yen, implying that the price level at which Yen are withdrawn becomes 1/θ.
Nature draws s from the prior distribution N(µ0, 1/α0). Each strategic trader i in period t
receives a private signal xbi,t = s + ξ
b
i,t/
√
βbt , where ξ
b
i,t is distributed according to N(0, 1) for
all i, t pairs and we assume that a law of large numbers across agents applies as in Judd [29].
Similarly, each strategic worker receives a private signal xwi,t = s+ ξ
w
i,t/
√
βwt , where ξ
w
i,t has again
a standard normal distribution.11 Signals are independent of the number of noise traders present
in the market. Strategic agents submit price-contingent demand schedules, so the equilibrium
debt price in each period conveys information on the realization of the fundamental variable s.12
Noise agents account for the additional, stochastic demand that is needed in rational-expectation
models to have a non-degenerate equilibrium.
2.1 Trading in the Euro Economy
In the Euro economy, there is no uncertainty about the value of nominal contracts, which is
fixed at 1. At these prices, strategic workers are indifferent between storing their endowment
or lending it at a rate zero to the noise workers. Hence, they will absorb all of the demand
Φ(w2 ) ∈ (0, 1) with no effect on their lending rate.
Next, we consider bond trading in the secondary market (period 2). Bond supply is fixed
at one: both strategic and noise traders who purchased the bond in period 1 must sell it to
consume.
Strategic bond traders born in period 2 must choose whether to store their entire endowment
or purchase a government bond in the secondary market.13 Defining q2 := 1/(1 +R2), where R2
11We assume that the law of large numbers applies here too.
12Given that we assume risk neutrality, the optimal demand schedule will take the form of a reservation price,
below which strategic agents are willing to buy government debt.
13They could also lend to noise workers at the same rate as storage; since their mass is negligible compared to
workers, this would not affect the market-clearing condition for trade credit between periods 2 and 3.
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Govt Traders1 Traders2 SW NW
t = 1 issue e1
t = 2 c2 e2 e2 c2
t = 3 repay c3 c3 e3
Figure 1: Markets in the Euro scenario. Goods (solid black); Bonds (dashed blue); Storage
(dotted black). e stands for endowment and c for consumption.
is the nominal interest rate (yield to maturity) in the secondary market, the expected net profit
from buying the bond is
sˆ(q1)
[
θ + (1− θ)E(1− δ|Ibi,2)− q2
]
, (1)
where δ = 1 when s < sˆ(q1) (the states in which the government defaults) and Ibi,t is the
information available to bond trader i in period t. We denote by Dbt the demand for bonds by
strategic bond traders in period t; this demand depends on the price qt, but also on the details of
available information, which vary across the cases of Sections 3-5. Second-period strategic bond
traders must absorb a fraction 1−Φ(b2) of bonds in equilibrium, with the balance purchased by
noise traders. Market clearing will then require
Db2 = 1− Φ(b2). (2)
Going back to period 1, strategic bond traders born at that time must choose whether to store
their entire endowment or purchase a government bond in the primary market. The expected
profit from buying a bond is
sˆ(q1)
{
E[q2|Ibi,1]− q1
}
.
Market clearing in the first period requires
Db1 = 1− Φ(b1). (3)
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Govt Traders1 SW/Traders2 NW
t = 1 issue e1
t = 2 repay c2 e2 c2
t = 3 buy back c3 e3
Figure 2: Markets in the Yen scenario. Goods (solid black); Bonds (dashed blue); Cash (dot-
dashed green); Storage (dotted black). e stands for endowment and c for consumption.
The equilibrium is therefore characterized by the primary- and secondary-market interest rates
on government debt, which are summarized by the discount factors q1 and q2.
2.2 Trading in the Yen Economy
In the Yen economy, there is no uncertainty about the nominal repayment from government
bonds, which happens in cash in period 2. However, the terminal value of cash in period 3
depends on tax revenues. Strategic workers must decide whether to store their endowment until
period 3 or to sell their goods in period 2 for cash or trade credit, at a price P2. Noise workers
will demand goods in period 2 in exchange for trade credit, in a fixed amount Φ(w2 ) ∈ (0, 1).
Traders born in period 1 will also use their cash to buy goods in period 2; by assumption, their
demand is negligible compared to that of the workers.
The payoff for a strategic worker of selling a unit of goods right away relative to storing it is
E
(
1
P3
|Iwi,2
)
− 1
P2
, (4)
where Iwi,2 is the information available to the worker and P3 is the nominal price in period 3,
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which is either 1 or 1/θ, depending on whether s ≥ sˆ(q1). Hence, equation (4) becomes14
θ + (1− θ)E(1− δ|Iwi,2)−
1
P2
. (5)
Letting Dw2 be the fraction of strategic workers selling the goods in period 2 (demanding cash or
trade credit), market clearing in period 2 requires
Dw2 = Φ(
w
2 ) = 1− Φ(−w2 ). (6)
Since there is no secondary market for government bonds in period 2, noise traders are not
active.15 Strategic traders face the same choice as the workers: either store their endowment or
sell it for cash or trade credit. Since their mass is negligible relative to that of the workers, their
choice has no effect on market clearing and prices.
Going back to period 1, the problem of strategic bond traders in period 1 is similar to the
Euro economy, except that their payoff is now a fixed amount of Yen with uncertain value rather
than an uncertain amount of Euros. The expected profit from buying a bond is
sˆ(q1)
{
E[
1
P2
|Ibi,1]− q1
}
,
and market clearing is still given by (3).
The equilibrium is now characterized by the primary-market interest rate on government debt,
summarized by the discount factor q1, and the nominal price level P2.
2.3 Comparing the Two Economies
The construction of an equilibrium in the two economies is very similar. The only difference
between the two concerns the identity of the marginal agent in period 2. In the Euro scenario,
this is a bond trader active in the secondary market, while in the case of Yen-denominated debt it
is a worker selling her goods in exchange for nominal payments. This is seen comparing equations
(1) and (2) for the Euro economy with equations (5) and (6) of the Yen economy.
14δ is the same indicator function as in the Euro model, except that now it indicates states of high inflation in
period 3 rather than default.
15Recall that we assumed that the demand from noise traders is a fraction of the supply of bonds.
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Euro Lira
Identity of bond
marginal buyer trader worker
Goods given up sˆ(q1)q2 1
Goods received:
w/o default/inflation: sˆ(q1) P2/P3 = P2
with default/inflation: θsˆ(q1) P2/P3 = θP2
Return:
w/o default/inflation: 1/q2 P2
with default/inflation: θ/q2 θP2
Table 1: Comparison of the payoffs of strategic agents in period 2.
The parameters of interest are thus the relative information that workers and second-period
traders have about the government’s ability to raise taxes in the final period. Our key assumption
is that bond traders are more informed than workers, that is, they have a more precise signal
(βb2 > β
w
2 ) and face less market noise (ψ
b
2 > ψ
w
2 ).
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Table 1 highlights the symmetry between the two scenarios, which we exploit to collapse the
two cases into a single problem. Accordingly, we drop the superscripts referring to workers and
traders, we define q2 := 1/P2 in the case of the Yen, and we refer to “demand” by second-period
strategic agents as their real demand for risky assets, which is their supply of goods: in the case
of the Euro, traders acquire government bonds in the secondary market, whereas in the case of
the Yen workers acquire cash or trade credit.17
16We state our results separately for β2 and ψ2, but in practice their effect is quite similar, and what matters
for characterizing the equilibrium are only their products β2ψ2 and β2(1 + ψ2).
17As we discuss later, individual demand will take the form of a reservation price. This convention preserves
the feature that strategic agents will want to “demand” the asset (and supply goods) when q2 is low. In the case
of the bond traders, q2 is the price of the bond, which they want to acquire only below their reservation price; in
the case of workers q2 is the inverse of the price level, and workers choose to sell their goods for nominal claims
when P2 is sufficiently high relative to their expectations about P3.
13
We thus proceed by analyzing a single problem, in which we drop the superscripts referring
to workers and traders, and studying comparative statics with respect to β2 and ψ2.
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3 The Simplest Case: No Recall of Past Prices
In this section, we study the simpler case in which agents buying in period two do not have any
information on the equilibrium price from period one and sˆ(q1) ≡ sˆ is constant. This allows
us to derive particularly transparent intuition. In Section 4, we move to the case in which the
first-period price is observable to second-period agents, and in Section 5 we further add the
possibility that the default threshold depends on the interest rate paid by the government at
issuance (letting sˆ vary with q1). Let d(xi,t, qt) denote demand schedules in each period, forming
a mapping d : R2 → {0, 1} from signal-price pairs (xi,t, qt) into risky asset holdings. Given that
we assume risk neutrality, the optimal demand schedule will take the form of a reservation price.
3.1 Strategies, Beliefs and Equilibrium
Definition 1. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of bidding strategies d(xi,t, qt) for strate-
gic players, price functions qt(s, t) and posterior beliefs pt(xi,t, qt) such that
(i) d(xi,t, qt) is optimal given beliefs pt(xi,t, qt),
(ii) qt(s, t) clears the market for all (s, t), and
(iii) pt(xi,t, qt) satisfies Bayes’ Law for all market clearing prices qt.
To characterize the equilibrium we work backwards, starting from period 2. The derivation of
the second-period equilibrium follows Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski [3]. Second-period agent i’s
expected payoff of buying the risky asset is sˆ[θ+ (1− θ)Prob(s ≥ sˆ|xi,2, q2)− q2]. Since posterior
beliefs over s are increasing in xi,2 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance,
19 agents’
18We exploit the symmetry of the normal distribution in equation (6) and renormalize 2 = −w2 in the case of
the Yen economy.
19See Proposition 6 in the appendix.
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expected payoffs are an increasing function of xi,2. This implies that agents follow monotone
strategies of the form
d(xi,2, q2) = 1[xi,2 ≥ xˆ2(q2)], (7)
where 1 is the indicator function and xˆ2(q2) is a threshold which is endogenous to the equilibrium.
Integrating strategic players’ demand schedules over the signal distribution, the market clear-
ing condition in either period t = 1, 2 is∫
d(x, qt)
√
βtφ[
√
βt(x− s)]dx+ Φ(t) = 1, (8)
where φ is the density of a standard normal distribution. In general, this equation characterizes
the equilibrium price qt(s, t). Using equation (7), the aggregate demand of strategic agents is
Prob[xi,2 ≥ xˆ2(q2)|s], and the market clearing condition becomes
z2 := s+
2√
β2
= xˆ2(q2). (9)
Henceforth we will focus on equilibria where the price is a continuous function of s and 2. In
this case, Proposition 7 proves that conditioning beliefs about s (and other exogenous events)
on q2 is equivalent to conditioning them on z2. This simplifies the analysis in that z2 is itself
exogenous. Second-period agents’ posterior beliefs in an equilibrium are given by
s|xi,2, z2 ∼ N
(
α0µ0 + β2xi,2 + β2ψ2z2
α0 + β2(1 + ψ2)
,
1
α0 + β2(1 + ψ2)
)
. (10)
An agent whose private signal is at the threshold xˆ2(q2) must be indifferent in equilibrium
between buying risky claims or storing. Combining this with equation (9), q2(z2) must satisfy
the indifference condition
q2(z2) = θ + (1− θ)Prob(s ≥ sˆ|xi,2 = z2, z2) = θ + (1− θ)Φ
(
(1− wS)µ0 + wSz2 − sˆ
σS
)
, (11)
where wS =
β2(1+ψ2)
α0+β2(1+ψ2)
is the Bayesian weight on z2, that summarizes new private and public
information for the marginal second-period agent, and σS is the standard deviation of the condi-
tional beliefs of secondary-market participants, which in this case is (α0 + β2(1 + ψ2))
−1/2 from
equation (10). As it’s clear from Equation (11), q2 exists and is unique for all z2 ∈ R.20
20This will apply to the more general cases where second-period agents also observe q1, and sˆ = sˆ(q1).
15
Having defined equilibrium price and strategies in the second period, we can move to the
first period and derive strategic bond traders’ behavior. The analysis follows that of period
two quite closely. Traders i’s expected payoff of buying government bonds in period one is
E[q2(z2)|xi,1, q1] − q1. Since q2(z2) is increasing in z2 and Proposition 6 applies to first-period
agents’ beliefs as well, they optimally follow monotone strategies which, given risk neutrality,
will be described by a threshold signal of the form d(xi,1, q1) = 1[xi,1 ≥ xˆ1(q1)].
Repeating the steps that led to (9), the market clearing condition in the first period can be
rewritten as
z1 := s+
1√
β1
= xˆ1(q1) (12)
As in period two, we focus on equilibria where the price is a continuous function of s and 1, in
which case conditioning on q1 or the observable state variable z1 is equivalent for forming beliefs
about s. In any such equilibrium, traders’ posterior beliefs on s are given by
s|xi,1, z1 ∼ N
(
α0µ0 + β1xi,1 + β1ψ1z1
α0 + β1(1 + ψ1)
,
1
γ1
:=
1
α0 + β1(1 + ψ1)
)
. (13)
However note that the payoff-relevant variable that traders need to predict is not just s, but
z2, because the latter is what determines the resale price in period two. Since z2|(xi,1, z1) =
s|(xi,1, z1) + 2/
√
β2, the marginal bond trader’s posterior beliefs on z2 are given by
z2|(xi,1 = z1, z1) ∼ N
(
α0µ0 + β1(1 + ψ1)z1
γ1
, σ2S|B :=
1
γ1
+
1
ψ2β2
)
(14)
where σ2S|B is the variance of the second-period agents’ sufficient statistic z2 conditional on first-
period bond traders’ information.
The marginal agent whose private signal is at the threshold xˆ1(q1) must be indifferent in
equilibrium between buying government bonds or storage. Let us denote the Bayesian weight
she puts on z1 when forecasting s as
wB :=
β1(1 + ψ1)
α0 + β1(1 + ψ1)
. (15)
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Then market clearing (12) and the indifference condition can be used to solve for q1:
q1(z1) = E[q2(z2)|xi,1 = z1, z1]
= θ + (1− θ)
∫
Φ
(
(1− wS)µ0 + wSz2 − sˆ
σS
)
1
σS|B
φ
(
z2 − (1− wB)µ0 + wBz1
σS|B
)
dz2
= θ + (1− θ)Φ
 [1− wSwB]µ0 + wSwBz1 − sˆ√
w2Sσ
2
S|B + σ
2
S
 .
(16)
Since we assume sˆ exogenous, existence and uniqueness of q1(z1) here are guaranteed.
3.2 Comparative Statics
We now expose our main result, that states that a government that faces a bad shock realization
compared to its prior would benefit from a decrease in secondary agents’ information precision.
That is, the “Euro” scenario would prove more adverse in such a situation. In the case of the
second-period price q2, this result is straightforward from equation (11): the more informed are
the second-period agents (higher β2), the more they will trust their signal; furthermore, the
more informed are their trading partners (by symmetry, this is also due to higher β2) or the
less market noise is present (higher ψ2), the more the price will aggregate the strategic agents’
information. Both of these forces lead the strategic agents to put less weight on the prior, so
that their demand will be more responsive to incoming bad news. Mathematically, the result
follows from two effects:
1. second-period mean weight channel: an increase in β2 or ψ2 increases the weight
of z2 in second-period agents’ beliefs on s. This effect appears from the term wS at the
numerator of (11).
2. second-period information precision channel: an increase in β2 or ψ2 decreases the
noise over s for second-period agents, thus making q2 more responsive to the state because
information on it is more precise. This effect appears from the term σS in the denominator.
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Figure 3: Effect of a Change in Second-Period Information Precision β2 or ψ2 on Debt Price q1.
The more interesting result concerns the first period. Even when the second-period price is set
by relatively uninformed agents, as it happens in our Yen scenario, bonds are still purchased by
well-informed traders in the first period. What we need to show is that these sophisticated traders
will also find it optimal to be less responsive to incoming news when they anticipate being able to
oﬄoad their position onto a less-informed party. This is established by the following propositions:
Proposition 1. There exists a cutoff level zˆβ1 ∈ R such that when z1 < zˆβ1 , a decrease in β2
improves the issuance price q1, whereas the reverse occurs for z1 > zˆ
β
1 .
Proposition 2. There exists a cutoff level zˆψ1 ∈ R such that when z1 < zˆψ1 , a decrease in ψ2
improves the issuance price q1, whereas the reverse occurs for z1 > zˆ
ψ
1 .
Figure (3) illustrates these results with an example. We analyze the components of q1(z1)
more in detail and provide some intuition. The formal proofs of the propositions are in the
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appendix. We can rewrite q1 as
q1 = θ + (1− θ)Φ

µ0 − sˆ+
1︷︸︸︷
wS wB(z1 − µ0)√√√√√ w2S︸︷︷︸
3
(
1
γ1
+
1
β2ψ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
+ σ2S︸︷︷︸
2

. (17)
We can decompose the effect of a change in β2 and ψ2 on q1 into the four different channels we
highlight in equation (17):
1. second-period mean weight channel: this is the same as described for q2. In the
context of the first-period price, it is multiplied by wB, because that is the weight first-
period traders give to z1 when forecasting z2.
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2. second-period information precision channel: this second effect is also what we de-
scribed for q2. It is now only one of the elements driving the denominator in equation
(17).
3. first-period variance weight channel: as β2 or ψ2 increase, the first two channels make
q2 more responsive to z2; however, z2 is affected by noise agents as well as fundamentals,
and this channel alone would decrease the first-period traders’ ability to predict the second-
period price through z1. This effect is represented by w
2
S in the denominator and would go
in the direction of making the price less responsive to z1.
4. first-period guess precision channel: closely related to the previous point, β2 and ψ2
affect the precision of the endogenous price signal in period two: in particular, as we see in
equation (9), an increase in β2 or ψ2 implies that z2 becomes more closely correlated with s
and thus z1, while the importance of the noise agents is correspondingly diminished. This
effect appears from the term
(
1
γ1
+ 1
β2ψ2
)
in the denominator.22
21The presence of wB reflects the attenuation emphasized in Allen, Morris, and Shin [4]. In our comparative
statics exercise, wB remains the same across the Yen and Euro economy, while wS changes.
22Combining effects (3) and (4) alone, we would get an ambiguous result. An increase in β2 or ψ2 increases
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The proofs in the appendix show that the channels (1), (2), and (4) always dominate channel
(3). Hence, when the realization of z1 is low, the price q1 is more resilient if second-period agents
are less well informed (lower β2 or ψ2).
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According to our interpretation, lower values of β2 and ψ2 arise when debt is denominated
in a currency over which the country has control, which allows recourse to inflation rather
than outright default. In this case, second-period agents are workers setting their prices in the
local currency. In contrast, when inflation is not an option and debt is subject to the risk of
outright default, second-period agents correspond to a new cohort of well-informed bond traders.
Propositions 1 and 2 then state that the price of debt will be more resilient to bad shocks in the
former case. We view this result as particularly relevant for countries that start from a favorable
prior: for them, there is limited upside from further confirming the creditors’ belief that there
is ample fiscal space, while there is substantial downside risk should they find out that fiscal
constraints are tighter than they appeared. This is a good description of Eurozone countries in
2008, as well as other major developed economies, all of which paid very low interest rates before
the onset of the crisis.
Our result also highlights a potentially opposite conclusion for a country that starts from an
adverse prior. For such a country, issuing domestically-denominated debt may immediately lead
workers to expect high inflation, and this pessimism will spill over to the traders who underwrite
the debt, through the channels that we emphasize. When realized fiscal space is indeed limited,
as will happen often if the prior is correct, there is not much that can be done to sustain the
price of debt. However, in the event that fundamentals are more favorable, well-informed traders
will be better placed to detect the situation, and debt will correspondingly fetch a higher price
when issued in foreign currency. We view this as more relevant for countries such as those of
Latin America and this may be another explanation for their past inclination to issue dollar-
the weight given to z2, which can only be partially forecasted, but decreases the variance of such guess. As an
example, on their own, these two channels would go in the direction opposite of Proposition 1 close to β2 = 0:
around that point, an increase in second-period precision decreases the predictability of q2 given z1.
23A bad realization of z1 can be driven either by a low value of fiscal capacity s or small demand from noise
traders (low 1). Both represent an adverse event for the government. When first-period traders are well informed,
this realization will be mostly driven by fiscal capacity.
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denominated debt.24
4 What if there is Recall of the Primary-Market Price?
In the previous section, we have examined the case where agents in the second period do not
observe q1. We now study what happens in the more likely scenario in which q1 is known
by second-period agents as well. Other than this, we retain the same structure as described
in the previous section. In particular, we maintain the assumption that the default threshold
is independent of the first-period price; in Section 5 we will show that the same results hold
when the threshold is endogenous, as long as complementarities are not as strong as to generate
equilibrium multiplicity.
4.1 Strategies and Equilibrium
The equilibrium structure of the modified game is largely identical to that of Section 3. We rele-
gate the definition of an equilibrium to the appendix. Posterior beliefs over s are still increasing
in xi,2 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance,
25 and agents follow monotone strategies
of the form
d(xi,2, q1, q2) = 1[xi,2 ≥ xˆ2(q1, q2)].
Using the same steps as in Section 3, the market-clearing condition becomes
z2 = s+
2√
β2
= xˆ2(q1, q2). (18)
We focus once more on equilibria where conditioning beliefs on the prices (q1, q2) is equivalent
to conditioning them on the exogenous state state variables (z1, z2) as defined in equations (12)
and (9), and where conditioning beliefs on q1 is equivalent to conditioning them on z1. For these
equilibria we obtain
s|xi,2, z2, z1 ∼ N
(
α0µ0 + β1ψ1z1 + β2xi,2 + β2ψ2z2
α0 + β1ψ1 + β2(1 + ψ2)
,
1
α0 + β1ψ1 + β2(1 + ψ2)
)
(19)
24This reason is complementary to the time-inconsistency forces emphasized by Calvo [14], Bohn [12], Aguiar
et al. [2], Engel and Park [24], and Ottonello and Perez [33].
25See Proposition 6 in the appendix.
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and the marginal agent’s indifference condition becomes
q2(z1, z2) = θ + (1− θ)Φ
[
(1− w1,S − w2,S)µ0 + w1,Sz1 + w2,Sz2 − sˆ
σS
]
, (20)
where w1,S =
β1ψ1
α0+β1ψ1+β2(1+ψ2)
, w2,S =
β2(1+ψ2)
α0+β1ψ1+β2(1+ψ2)
are the Bayesian weights given by the
marginal second-period agent to first- and second-period information respectively, and, from
(19), the standard deviation of conditional beliefs is
σS =
√
1
α0 + β1ψ1 + β2(1 + ψ2)
.
It is easy to see that q2(z1, z2) is unique and exists for all (z1, z2) ∈ R2. In Section 3, the prior
was the only information element that was mutual common knowledge between period-1 and
period-2 agents. Here, period-2 agents condition their demand on the first-period price q1 as
well, which creates a new source of common knowledge. This common information is the source
of differences between the results of this section and the previous one.
Since the information set of first-period traders is the same of the previous section, their
posterior beliefs on z2 conditional on xi,1 and z1 are still given by (14). From the indifference
condition of the marginal trader we can derive the equilibrium price function
q1(z1) = E[q2(z1, z2)|xi,1 = z1, z1]
= θ + (1− θ)
∫
Φ
[
µ0(1− w1,S − w2,S) + w1,Sz1 + w2,Sz2 − sˆ
σS
]
· 1
σS|B
φ
(
z2 − (1− wB)µ0 − wBz1
σS|B
)
dz2
= θ + (1− θ)Φ
µ0
(
1− w1,S − w2,SwB
)
+ z1
(
w1,S + w2,SwB
)
− sˆ√
w22,S
(
1
γ1
+ 1
β2ψ2
)
+ σ2S
 ,
(21)
where wB and σ
2
S|B continue to be defined as in (14) and (15).
Much of the intuition behind equation (21) follows that in (17). There we highlighted that
a second-period agent’s information set included prior information (common to first-period
traders), and period-2 information (that first-period traders do not observe and must forecast
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using their information set). Here, the same dichotomy holds, with the difference that the in-
tersection between primary and secondary agents’ information sets now includes the first-period
price, in addition to the prior. This is reflected in the weight given by first-period traders to
state z1 in the numerator, w1,S + w2,SwB. w1,S represents the weight second-period agents give
to z1, a fact that is then taken into account by first-period traders. w2,S represents the weight
second-period agents put on z2, which traders predict using prior and first-period information
with weight 1− wB and wB respectively.
4.2 Comparative Statics
We now prove results analogous to Propositions 1 and 2. While comparative statics for ψ2 are
the same as in Section 3, an increase in β2 sharpens the sensitivity of the price to information
for a smaller set of the parameter space, due to the more complex information structure of the
current specification.
To build intuition, we rewrite q1 as
q1(z1) = θ + (1− θ)Φ
 µ0 − sˆ√
w22,Sσ
2
S|B + σ
2
S
+K(z1 − µ0)
 , (22)
with
K :=
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(w1,S + w2,SwB)√√√√√w22,S︸︷︷︸
3
(
1
γ1
+
1
β2ψ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
+ σ2S︸︷︷︸
2
. (23)
The key difference between the case we analyze here and the one we considered in Section 3 is
that now second-period agents form a posterior based on the first-period price as well as on their
prior and their idiosyncratic signal. When β2 or ψ2 increase, they will rely less on the prior, which
does not react to bad shocks, but also less on the first-period price. While second-period signals
are aggregated through the second-period price, which first-period agents can only imperfectly
forecast, the first-period price is effectively observable to them, as they are allowed to submit a
conditional demand schedule. Hence, when the second-period posterior weight shifts from the
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first-period price to second-period signals, the correlation between the two prices will decrease
and this may make first-period agents less responsive to their information. The further difference
between the results for β2 and ψ2 stems from an asymmetry in the way these precisions enter
in the problem of first- and second-period agents. Specifically, from the perspective of both, the
product of β2 and ψ2 determines the precision of the second-period price as an aggregator of
information. In addition to this, β2 has a further role as the precision of the idiosyncratic signal
observed by the marginal agent in the second period, which generates additional movement in
the weight w2,S and the precision σS.
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From a mathematical perspective, the single-crossing condition illustrated in Figure 3 is driven
by K, as defined in (23), which is the coefficient of z1 in (22): when it is bigger, the first-
period price becomes more responsive to the aggregate shock z1. Comparing this expression with
(17) from the previous section, the same four channels that we previously highlighted remain
active. The first-period guess precision channel (channel 4) remains exactly as before, since the
information set of first-period agents is unaffected. The second-period information precision and
first-period variance weight channels (channels 2 and 3) also remain similar, although the new
expressions for w2,S and σS imply a weaker response to increases in β2 and ψ2 because the second-
period agents now substitute away from the first-period price when their signal becomes more
precise or the second-period price better aggregates information. The biggest difference emerges
in the second-period mean weight channel (channel 1). When second-period agents receive more
precise information on the fundamentals, the shift away from the unconditional prior continues
to be a force increasing the impact of changes in fundamentals on the price; however, if the
first-period price is sufficiently informative, a shift away from z1 and towards z2 would decrease
the responsiveness of q2 to fundamentals instead. Moreover, z1 is known to first-period traders,
whereas they can only predict z2 with noise: hence, when q2 responds less to z1 directly and more
to z2, they respond themselves less aggressively.
27 While an increase in β2 or ψ2 continues to
26This asymmetry is discussed extensively in Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski [3].
27Mathematically, while the second-period agents’ weight on z2 (w2,S) is multiplied by wB , representing the
imperfect ability of first-period traders to predict it, the weight second-period agents give on z1 passes through
to first-period traders without any dampening.
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Figure 4: Examples of coefficient K as a function of β2.
increase responsiveness of the price through the second-period mean weight channel, this channel
is now weakened, which matters when we combine all of the effects in equation (23).
In the case of Section 3, the coefficient of z1 in (17) is globally increasing in both β2 and ψ2.
Here, the analogous coefficient K remains globally increasing in ψ2, as we prove in Proposition 3,
but it is not necessarily globally increasing in β2. In the appendix, we prove that this coefficient
is either monotonically increasing in β2, or it has a single interior minimum, as illustrated in the
two panels of Figure 4. In this latter case, it is possible that, starting from a situation in which
second-period agents have no signal of their own, providing them with a very noisy signal would
decrease the sensitivity of the first-period price to the aggregate shock z1.
Our main case of interest is comparing the situation in which second-period agents are bond
traders in the secondary market with the case in which they are less-informed price setters
accepting local currency in exchange for goods. In this comparison, it would be natural to start
from the case in which first and second-period bond traders are symmetric, in that they have
a signal of equal precision. If anything, we would expect the second-period traders to receive
more precise signals, as the passage of time could only reveal more information (in addition
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to the first-period price). Starting from such a situation, any move in the direction of lower
second-period precision (whether it is a small local perturbation or a large deviation) decreases
the sensitivity of the first-period price. This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 4.
Formally, the following propositions apply:
Proposition 3. There exists a cutoff level zˆψ1 ∈ R such that when z1 < zˆψ1 , a decrease in ψ2
improves the issuance price q1, whereas the reverse occurs for z1 > zˆ
ψ
1 .
Proposition 4. Assume that ψ2 ≥ ψ1 and βA2 ≥ β1. Let βB2 < βA2 . Then there exists a cutoff
level zˆβ1 ∈ R such that when z1 < zˆβ1 , q1 evaluated at βA2 is smaller than at βB2 , whereas the
reverse occurs for z1 > zˆ
β
1 , holding all other parameters fixed.
We conclude that our main result is robust to the case in which the first-period price is
observed by second-period agents: it remains the case that a government which starts from a
good prior, but has a negative realization would fetch a better price for its debt when it is issued
in local currency than when it is denominated in a currency over which it has no control.
5 Endogenous Default Threshold
In the previous section we maintained the assumption that the government’s default cutoff is ex-
ogenous and independent of the primary-market price. We now relax this assumption as well and
consider the case in which the default threshold is given by a function sˆ(q1). As an example, this
happens if the debt auction follows the same structure as in Calvo [15]: the government requires
a given debt auction revenue, which we normalize to unity, while its repayment obligations at
the end of the second period depend on the interest rate and are given by 1/q1. A default occurs
in this case if and only if s < 1/q1, so in this case sˆ(q1) = 1/q1.
The introduction of an endogenous default threshold creates a new source of complementarity
and could potentially generate multiple equilibria if information is sufficiently precise (Hellwig,
Mukherji and Tsyvinski [27], Angeletos and Werning [11]). We study the case where a unique
equilibrium is maintained, which happens when information is sufficiently dispersed.
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The construction of an equilibrium is very similar to what we did in Section 4. All the steps
up to equation (20) remain the same, where sˆ is replaced by sˆ(q1). As of period 2, sˆ(q1) is a
given, so that existence and uniqueness given q1 are established as before. The main difference
arises in equation (21), where now the endogenous threshold implies that q1(z1) is only implicitly
characterized by the solution to the following equation:
q1 = θ + (1− θ)Φ
 µ0 − sˆ(q1)√
w22,Sσ
2
S|B + σ
2
S
+K(z1 − µ0)
 , (24)
where K is given by the same expression as in the case of an exogenous threshold, as defined in
equation (23).
Assumption 1. At any equilibrium price, the slope of the right-hand side of (24) with respect
to q1 is smaller than one.
Assumption 1 is necessary and sufficient to guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium price
function q1(z1). As an example, for the Calvo threshold sˆ(q1) = 1/q1, a sufficient condition for
Assumption 1 to hold is √
w22,Sσ
2
S|B + σ
2
S >
1− θ
θ2
1√
2pi
,
that is, the total amount of information in the economy should not be too high. In this specifica-
tion, the price q1 affects equilibrium equation (24) in two ways: it represents the cost of buying
government bonds (left-hand side), and it affects the repayment probabilities via its impact on
the default cutoff (right-hand side). The latter effect is amplified by information precision since
it acts through posterior beliefs. When information precision is very high, locally it may happen
that this default cutoff effect is strong enough to generate multiple equilibria. We instead con-
sider the case in which there is enough noise that the curve describing how q1 varies in response
to z1 does not bend backwards, so that q1 remains a well-defined (and increasing) function of z1.
In Section 4, we could establish results about the sensitivity of the price to z1 by simply
studying the properties of the coefficient K. Now, the analysis is complicated by the fact that
q1 appears on the right-hand side through its effect on the default threshold. We prove in the
appendix that this does not change our results for the comparative statics when ψ2 varies, so
that Proposition 3 continues to hold.
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Concerning β2, in Section 4 we could always rely on the fact that two price functions drawn
for different values would cross only once, with the direction dictated by the magnitude of K.
We can no longer prove this here. However, even if single-crossing fails, prices will move in the
same way as described in Proposition 4 following tail events. Formally:
Proposition 5. Assume that ψ2 ≥ ψ1 and βA2 ≥ β1, and let Assumption 1 hold. Let βB2 < βA2 .
Then there exist two cutoffs level zˆL1 ≤ zˆH1 ∈ R such that when z1 < zˆL1 , q1 evaluated at βA2 is
smaller than at βB2 , whereas the reverse occurs for z1 > zˆ
H
1 , holding all other parameters fixed.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is that, for z1 large in absolute value, the dominant force
determining how the price moves with β2 remains K, for which we already proved theorems in
the previous section.
6 Conclusion
Inflation risk and default risk affect the real value of maturing government debt in a similar way.
However, the general price level is driven by the interaction among a much larger fraction of
the population than the restricted group of people who actively participate in the government
debt market. To the extent that information about government finances is unevenly distributed
within the population, we have shown that this asymmetry has important implications for the
resilience of debt prices in the face of adverse shocks.
In this paper, we emphasized one reason why inflation reacts sluggishly to fundamentals. Our
results would also apply in different contexts where other frictions force a slower adjustment in
the prices of goods relative to asset prices, such as sticky-price models.
Our analysis opens a new dimension for the study of optimal debt management, in addition
to the traditional channels of fiscal hedging and time consistency. The next step in this direction
is to further develop a full theory of the optimal denomination of debt. Such a theory would
take into account the insurance aspect that we have studied here, together with the effects of
different structures of debt on the ex ante expected borrowing costs.28
28As emphasized in Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski [3], in the context of the model that we adopt, the rela-
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Appendix A Proofs
Proposition 6 (Belief Stochastic Dominance). In each period, agents’ posterior beliefs over s
are increasing in their private signal in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove this for the more complex case of Sections 4 and 5; the
proof for the Section 3 economy is simpler and follows the same steps.
Denote with F (s|xi,2, q1, q2) the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the posterior beliefs
on s for a second-period agent with private signal xi,2, after observing primary-market price
q1 and when the equilibrium secondary-market price is q2. Similarly, let h(x|s, q1, q2) be the
probability density function of the second-period idiosyncratic signal conditional on (s, q1, q2),
and G(s|q1, q2) be the conditional cdf of s given q1 and q2. By Bayes’ rule,
F (s|x, q1, q2) =
∫ s
−∞ h(x|y, q1, q2)dG(y|q1, q2)∫ +∞
−∞ h(x|y, q1, q2)dG(y|q1, q2)
. (25)
To prove first-order stochastic dominance, we show that, if x2 < xˆ2, then
F (s|x2,q1,q2)
F (s|xˆ2,q1,q2) > 1 whenever
the two cdf’s are strictly between 0 and 129. First, note that the ratio converges to 1 as s→ +∞.
We obtain
F (s|x2, q1, q2)
F (s|xˆ2, q1, q2) =
∫ s
−∞ h(x2|y, q1, q2)dG(y|q1, q2)∫ s
−∞ h(xˆ2|y, q1, q2)dG(y|q1, q2)
·
∫ +∞
−∞ h(xˆ2|y, q1, q2)dG(y|q1, q2)∫ +∞
−∞ h(x2|y, q1, q2)dG(y|q1, q2)
.
The second fraction on the right-hand side is independent of s. h(·|s, q1, q2) is independent of
(q1, q2) and normally distributed, so that
h(x2|y)
h(xˆ2|y) >
h(x2|s)
h(xˆ2|s) for all y < s. We next prove that
W (s) :=
∫ s
−∞ h(x2|y,q1,q2)dG(y|q1,q2)∫ s
−∞ h(xˆ2|y,q1,q2)dG(y|q1,q2)
is decreasing in s, and strictly so in regions of positive proba-
bility. This completes the proof, since we know that F (s|x2,q1,q2)
F (s|xˆ2,q1,q2) converges to 1 in the limit. Let
tionship between the expected price of a security and its fundamental expected value ex ante is driven by the
concavity or convexity of the payoff as a function of the underlying fundamental. In our case, the payoff of
the first-period traders takes the shape of a normal cumulative distribution function, with both a convex and a
concave piece that play against each other, so that we cannot establish a definite ranking.
29Since h is a normal density (with unbounded support), equation (25) implies that F (·|x2, q1, q2) and
F (·|xˆ2, q1, q2) are absolutely continuous with respect to each other, for any values x2 and xˆ2; hence, the sets
on which they are 0 and 1 coincide.
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s2 > s1 such that G(s1|q1, q2) > 0,30 then
W (s2)−W (s1) =
∫
y≤s1 h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2) +
∫ s2
s1
h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)∫
y<s1
h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2) +
∫ s2
s1
h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
−
∫
y≤s1 h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)∫
y<s1
h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2) =∫ s2
s1
h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
∫
y≤s1 h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)−
∫
y≤s1 h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
∫ s2
s1
h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)∫
y≤s2 h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
∫
y≤y1 h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
≤
h(xˆ2|y)
h(x2|y)
∫
y≤s2 h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
∫
y≤y1 h(xˆ2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
·[∫ s2
s1
h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
∫
y≤s1
h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)−
∫ s2
s1
h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
∫
y≤s1
h(x2|y)dG(y|q1, q2)
]
= 0,
where the inequality is strict if G has positive mass on (s1, s2]. The posterior beliefs on s of a
first-period trader with private signal xi,1 are given by F (s|xi,1, q1). Proving these are increasing
in xi,1 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance follows the same steps used above for
second-period beliefs.
Proposition 7 (Informational Equivalence of z and q in the case of no recall (Section 3)).
Assume that in equilibrium the price q1 is a continuous function of (s, 1) and the second-period
price q2 is a continuous function of (s, 2). Let Σ1 be the σ-algebra generated by the pi-system
{q ∈ R : q1 ≤ q} and Σˆ1 by {z ∈ R : z1 ≤ z}, with z1 as defined in (12). Similarly, let Σ2 be
the σ-algebra generated by the pi-system {q ∈ R : q2 ≤ q} and Σˆ2 by {z ∈ R : z2 ≤ z}, with z2 as
defined in (9). Then Σ1 = Σˆ1 and Σ2 = Σˆ2.
Proof of Proposition 7. First, note that equation (9) follows directly from Proposition 6 and
risk neutrality. Second, note that the function xˆ2(q2) is defined via the indifference condition
θ + (1− θ)Prob(s ≥ sˆ|xi,2 = xˆ2, q2) = q2. (26)
Consider interior prices q2 ∈ (θ, 1). Since conditional repayment probabilities are strictly in-
creasing in the private signal xˆ2, it follows that xˆ2(q2) exists and is unique.
31 Then the market
30If G(s1|q1, q2) = 0, then F (s1|x, q1, q2) = 0 for all x.
31Existence follows because, when q2 ∈ (θ, 1), the price does not reveal fully whether s ≥ sˆ. Bayes’ rule then
implies that the left-hand side converges to θ as xˆ2 → −∞ and to 1 as xˆ2 →∞.
30
clearing condition (9) is a single-valued mapping from the price q2 to the linear combination of
shocks z2 := s+ 2/
√
β2 = xˆ2(q2).
Next, we use the property above to prove that corner prices cannot arise with positive prob-
ability in equilibria in which the price is continuous in (s, 2). Suppose by contradiction that
a positive-probability set H can be found for which q2 is equal to θ.
32 Since H has positive
probability, we can find two pairs (sA, A2 ) and (s
B, B2 ) that correspond to two different val-
ues of z2: z
A
2 and z
B
2 . Next, consider the price as a function of s moving along the two lines
s + 2/
√
β2 = z
A
2 and s + 2/
√
β2 = z
B
2 . As s increases along the lines, the price will eventually
have to increase, since a price of θ implies that H must lie below sˆ almost surely. Since q2 is
continuous, there must be two points (s˜A, ˜A2 ) and (s˜
B, ˜B2 ) on the two lines where the price is
interior and the same. This contradicts what we have proved, since we showed that, whenever
the price is interior, z2 = xˆ2(q2), with xˆ2 being single valued.
Having established that the price is almost surely interior, we return to market clearing and
notice that xˆ2 is continuous in (s, 2). Given that q2 is also continuous in (s, 2) by assumption, xˆ2
must be a measurable function of q2 and thus it is measurable with respect to Σ2 (i.e., xˆ2 is known
to somebody who knows the realization of q2). This then implies that z2 is also Σ2-measurable.
We next prove that q2 is Σˆ2-measurable. This proof follows the arguments of Pa´lvo¨lgyi and
Venter [34]. By contradiction, suppose that (on a set of positive measure) there are two vectors
(sC , C2 ) 6= (sD, D2 ) that lie on the same straight line indexed by z2 but that correspond to
different prices qC and qD, i.e. such that
sC + C2 /
√
β2 = z2, and q2(s
C , C2 ) = q
C
sD + D2 /
√
β2 = z2, and q2(s
D, D2 ) = q
D
Since q2 is continuous, the intermediate value theorem ensures that, for any curve that connects
(sC , C2 ) to (s
D, D2 ), there must be at least one point (s, 2) such that q2(s, 2) =
qC+qD
2
. First we
apply the theorem to the curve represented by the straight line connecting (sC , C2 ) to (s
D, D2 ),
and denote with (sˆ, ˆ2) the point on such line such that q2(sˆ, ˆ2) = (q
C + qD)/2. Along this
32The same logic applies to the case in which q2 = 1.
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line z2 remains constant. Second, we apply the theorem to any other curve which intersects
our straight line z2 only at (s
C , C2 ) and (s
D, D2 ), again such that (s˜, ˜2) lies on the curve and
q2(s˜, ˜2) = (q
C + qD)/2. It follows that we have found two different points, (sˆ, ˆ2) and (s˜, ˜2),
that correspond to the same price but are such that sˆ+ ˆ2/
√
β2 6= s˜+ ˜2/
√
β2. This contradicts
the necessary market clearing condition (9).
The proof for the first period repeats the same steps as above.
Lemma 1. Let us denote a general version of the primary-market price as
q1(z1) = θ + (1− θ)Φ
[
µ0 − sˆ
S
+K(z1 − µ0)
]
,
where S :=
√
w2SσS|B + σ
2
S and K := wSwB/S for Section 3, while S :=
√
w22,Sσ
2
S|B + σ
2
S and
K is defined by (23) for Section 4. The partial derivatives of q1(z1) with respect to β2 and ψ2
respectively are given by
∂q1(z1)
∂β2
= (1− θ)φ
(
µ0 − sˆ
S
+K(z1 − µ0)
)[
(z1 − µ0)∂K
∂β2
−
(
µ0 − sˆ
S2
)
∂S
∂β2
]
∂q1(z1)
∂ψ2
= (1− θ)φ
(
µ0 − sˆ
S
+K(z1 − µ0)
)[
(z1 − µ0) ∂K
∂ψ2
−
(
µ0 − sˆ
S2
)
∂S
∂ψ2
]
.
(27)
Proof of Proposition 1. Formally the proposition states that
sign
(
∂q1(z1)
∂β2
)
= sign(z1 − zˆβ1 )
where zˆβ1 ∈ R depends on all the parameters of the economy. From Lemma 1 and
∂K
∂β2
=
β1(1 + ψ1)(1 + ψ2) [2α0ψ2 + β2(1 + 3ψ2 + 2ψ
2
2)]
2γ1ψ2σ
−4
S
√
σ−2S β2(1 + ψ2)2σ
2
S|B
> 0
it follows that sign
(
∂q1(z1)
∂β2
)
= sign(z1 − zˆβ1 ), where
zˆβ1 = µ0 +
(
µ0 − sˆ
S2
)(
∂K
∂β2
)−1
∂S
∂β2
.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Formally the proposition states that
sign
(
∂q1(z1)
∂ψ2
)
= sign(z1 − zˆψ1 )
where zˆψ1 ∈ R depends on all the parameters of the economy. From Lemma 1 and
∂K
∂ψ2
=
β1β2(1 + ψ1)
[
2ψ2σ
−2
S + β2(2 + 2ψ2)
]
2ψ2
√
σ−2S + β
2
2(1 + ψ2)
2σ2S|B
(
ψ2[α0γ1 + β22(1 + ψ2)
2] + γ1β2(1 + ψ2)(1 + 2ψ2)
) > 0
it follows that sign
(
∂q1(z1)
∂ψ2
)
= sign(z1 − zˆψ1 ), where
zˆψ1 = µ0 +
(
µ0 − sˆ
S2
)(
∂K
∂ψ2
)−1
∂S
∂ψ2
. (28)
Definition 2 (Definition of an equilibrium when the first-period price is known in the second
period). A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of bidding strategies d(xi,1, q1) and d(xi,2, q1, q2)
for strategic players, price functions q1(s, 1) and q2(s, 1, 2), and posterior beliefs p1(xi,1, q1) and
p2(xi,2, q1, q2) such that
(i) d(xi,1, q1) and d(xi,2, q1, q2) are optimal given beliefs p1(xi,1, q1) and p2(xi,2, q1, q2) respec-
tively;
(ii) q1(s, 1) and q2(s, 1, 2) clear the market for all (s, 1, 2); and
(iii) p1(xi,1, q1) and p2(xi,2, q1, q2) satisfy Bayes’ Law for all market clearing prices q1 and q2.
Proof of Proposition 3. By the same arguments of the proof of Proposition 2, qA1 and q
B
1
satisfy the single-crossing condition and intersect at zˆψ1 , function of all parameters of the Section 4
economy. Then qA1 crosses q
B
1 from below if and only if
∂K
∂ψ2
> 0, which is always true.
We now prove that the same result also holds in the case of Section 5, where the government
default threshold is endogenous. First, consider any of the (potentially multiple) intersections
between qA1 and q
B
1 , where ψ
A
2 > ψ
B
2 , and let us denote them with (zˆ
ψ
1 , qˆ
ψ
1 ). The slope of the
price function q1(z1) at any of such points is given by
∂q1(z1)
∂z1
∣∣∣∣
(zˆψ1 ,qˆ
ψ
1 )
=
(1− θ)φ
(
µ0−sˆ(qˆψ1 )
S
+K(zˆψ1 − µ0)
)
K
1 + (1− θ)φ
(
µ0−sˆ(qˆψ1 )
S
+K(zˆψ1 − µ0)
)
sˆ′(qˆψ1 )
S
.
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Since sˆ′(q) < 0 and K and S are respectively increasing and decreasing in ψ2, we can con-
clude that at all intersections qA1 crosses q
B
1 from below. This implies that (i) there can only
exist one crossing point (zˆψ1 , qˆ
ψ
1 ), and (ii) the direction of the crossing is indeed as described in
Proposition 3.
To explicitly characterize zˆψ1 , let us rearrange equation (24) to get SΦ
−1 ( q1−θ
1−θ
)
= µ0− sˆ(q1) +
KS(z1 − µ0): evaluated at (zˆψ1 , qˆψ1 ), this must hold when ψ2 is equal to either ψA2 or ψB2 . Sub-
tracting and rearranging we can characterize the crossing further:
qˆψ1 = θ + (1− θ)Φ
[
KASA −KBSB
SA − SB (zˆ
ψ
1 − µ0)
]
. (29)
where KA, SA correspond to the case where ψ2 = ψ
A
2 , while KB, SB correspond to the case where
ψ2 = ψ
B
2 . It is then possible to plug equation (29) into (24) and solve for the value of zˆ
ψ
1 .
Proof of Proposition 4. By the same arguments of the proof of Proposition 1, qA1 and q
B
1
satisfy the single-crossing condition and intersect at zˆβ1 , function of all parameters of the Section 4
economy. Then qA1 crosses q
B
1 from below if and only if K(β
A
2 ), the coefficient of z1 evaluated at
βA2 , is larger than K(β
B
2 ).
Note that condition ∂K
∂β2
> 0 is equivalent to
β2(1 + ψ2)(1 + ψ1 + 2ψ2)− β1ψ1(1 + ψ1) + α0(ψ1 − 2ψ2) > 0 (30)
which is linear and increasing in β2, and equals zero at βˆ2 =
β1ψ1(1+ψ1)+α0(ψ1−2ψ2)
(1+ψ2)(1+ψ1+2ψ2)
. The left panel
of Figure 4 is an example of βˆ2 ≤ 0, in which case K(βA2 ) > K(βB2 ) for all 0 < βB2 < βA2 . The right
panel instead represents the scenario where βˆ2 > 0 and K(β2) is not monotone increasing. To
prove the Proposition it is sufficient to show that K(β2 = β1) > K(β2 → 0), which is equivalent
to
β1[γ1 + β1(1 + ψ1)(ψ1 + ψ2)]√
γ1(γ1 + β1ψ2){α0ψ2 + β1[1 + (3 + ψ1)ψ2 + ψ22]}/ψ2
>
β1ψ1√
α0 + β1ψ1
.
When ψ2 ≥ ψ1, this is always satisfied and concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Examine the argument of the cumulative distribution function on
the right-hand side of (24). The second term is linear in z1 with coefficient K, while the first
34
term is a bounded function of z1 since sˆ(q1) ∈ (sˆ(1), sˆ(θ)). It follows that when z1 is sufficiently
large in absolute value, the response of q1 to changes in information precision will be driven solely
by ∂K
∂β2
as defined in (23) and characterized in (30).
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